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CIVIL LAW IN LOUISIANA 
THE CONTINUING DEBATE OF CONTINUING TORT: THE 
LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT OF THE 
CONTINUING TORT DOCTRINE IN HOGG V. CHEVRON 
USA, INC. 
Mark Assad* 
On July 6, 2010, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided an 
important installment in the debate surrounding the proper 
application of the continuing tort doctrine.1 The court held that, 
under Louisiana law, the continuing tort doctrine suspends 
prescription if the operating cause, defined by the majority as the 
initial tortious act of the defendant rather than the subsequent 
effects, is continuing in nature.  
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs brought suit against neighboring property owners, 
Chevron USA, Inc., and the operator of the service station located 
thereon, alleging property damage resulting from leaking gasoline 
tanks located beneath the service station.2 On discovering the leaks 
in 1997, defendant replaced the tanks. In 2001 and 2002, plaintiffs 
received two letters from the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality (LDEQ) apprising them of the gasoline 
contamination in the area surrounding the service station and 
informing the plaintiffs that LDEQ may ask permission to perform 
environmental tests on their property in the future. On September 
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12, 2006, the plaintiffs were contacted concerning access to their 
property for the purpose of conducting remediation. 
On September 6, 2007, the plaintiffs filed suit against the 
defendants under the tort theory of trespass “seeking damages for 
diminution of the value of their property, the stigma of owning 
contaminated property, loss of enjoyment of use of the property, 
and exemplary damages.”3 The plaintiffs argued that the presence 
of the gasoline, the defendants’ failure to remove it, and the ill 
effects sustained resulted in a viable claim in trespass under 
Louisiana tort law. Defendants subsequently filed motions for 
summary judgment asserting plaintiff’s action was barred by the 
one-year liberative prescription pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code 
articles 3492 and 3493. Defendants argued that plaintiffs were 
aware of the damage from the letters received in 2001 and 2002, 
and therefore prescription began to run upon receipt of those 
letters.4 Plaintiffs argued the letters were subject to more than one 
reasonable interpretation and summary judgment was inappropriate 
because the reasonableness of their interpretation was an issue of 
material fact to be decided at trial.5 The district court agreed with 
the plaintiffs and denied the defendant’s motions for summary 
judgment.6 The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, declined the 
defendant’s application for supervisory writ; however, the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana subsequently granted writs to review 
the district court’s denial of summary judgment.7 
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana addressed two primary issues 
in its decision. First, the Court had to decide whether or not the 
LDEQ letters sent to plaintiffs were sufficient to give them actual 
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or constructive knowledge of the contamination such that 
prescription began to run upon the plaintiffs’ receipt of the letters. 
Second, the Court addressed the continuing tort doctrine and 
whether or not it was applicable to the facts before the Court. 
Regarding the first issue, the Court noted that “there is no 
question as to what the plaintiffs knew and when [they knew it]” 
because the “[p]laintiffs’ knowledge is contained in the letters.”8 A 
plain reading of the letters, according to the Court, clearly 
indicated that there was soil and groundwater contamination in the 
area surrounding the service station; therefore, there was no issue 
of material fact regarding whether or not this amounted to actual or 
constructive knowledge.9 Instead, the Court framed the issue as 
whether or not the plaintiffs’ knowledge from the letters 
constitutes actual or constructive knowledge such that prescription 
began to run upon their receipt.10 Because the dispute concerns 
whether or not the letters amount to actual or constructive 
knowledge and not what the substance of the letters contained, the 
Court found that summary judgment was appropriate.11 
In addressing whether the doctrine of continuing tort would 
suspend prescription for the plaintiffs’ claim, the Court first 
addressed plaintiffs’ assertion that the presence of the gasoline on 
their property was a trespass, and its continued presence was, in 
fact, continuing tortious activity by the defendants.12 The Court 
also distinguished continuous and discontinuous operating causes, 
relying on Crump v. Sabine River Authority, where the Louisiana 
Supreme Court stated, “[a] continuing tort is occasioned by 
[continual] unlawful acts, not the continuation of the ill effects of 
an original, wrongful act.”13 Applying this standard to the present 
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case, the Court held that the operating cause of the injury was the 
leaking of the gasoline out of the tanks, which was abated in 1997, 
rather than the continued presence of the gasoline on the 
property.14 Therefore, the tortious activity alleged by plaintiffs 
ceased in 1997 and the continuing ill effects of that conduct does 
not suspend the running of prescription under the doctrine of 
continuing tort. However, prescription did not begin to run until 
years later because plaintiffs were not made aware of the injury 
until the letters were received in 2001 and 2002.15 Nevertheless, 
plaintiffs’ suit, filed in 2007, was not within the one-year 
prescriptive period for tort actions.16 
III. COMMENTARY 
First, the procedural posture of the case is worth noting. The 
appeal was from a motion for summary judgment that was denied 
at the trial court, thus the question was whether or not there was a 
genuine issue of material fact in existence such that judgment 
could not be rendered as a matter of law.17 Overturning the trial 
court’s ruling, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, because 
there was no issue of material fact regarding when the plaintiffs 
acquired actual or constructive knowledge, summary judgment was 
appropriate.18 The only question left after this factual 
determination was whether or not the defendant was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, which the court found it was through 
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the correct interpretation of the continuing tort doctrine. For the 
purposes of this note, the court’s treatment of the continuing tort 
doctrine is the central issue to be considered. 
The plaintiffs argued for the application of the continuing tort 
doctrine in order to circumvent prescription.19 The plaintiffs 
characterized the presence of the gasoline as a trespass and 
asserted, consequently, that the trespass continued as long as the 
gasoline remained on the property. The Court acknowledged this 
argument and summarily dismissed it for two reasons. First, the 
Court questioned whether the leaking of the gasoline was a 
trespass at all because there was little evidence that the defendants 
intended the gasoline to enter plaintiffs’ land.20 The Court only 
briefly questioned whether or not the gasoline’s presence was a 
trespass at all because a final determination on that issue was not 
necessary to address the continuing tort doctrine and prescription. 
As the Court noted, the issue of whether or not an underground 
leak falls within trespass, nuisance, neither, or both, is more 
appropriate for another discussion. 
Second, the Court stated that defining the presence of the 
gasoline as continuing tortious activity in the form of a trespass 
would render trespass “an imprescriptible species of tort, an 
argument at odds with the plain language of Louisiana Civil Code 
arts. 3492 and 3493, which makes no exception of trespass….”21 
The majority’s position on this issue is well grounded in light of 
the plain meaning of the prescription articles, which make no 
indication that an expansive reading is appropriate. In fact, the 
Official Revision Comment (b) to Louisiana Civil Code art. 3492 
                                                                                                             
 19. The applicable liberative prescription period in delictual actions is 
generally one year pursuant to LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492. See supra note 16. 
 20. Hogg, 45 So.3d at 1002 (the Court specifically states in n.11 that “civil 
trespass is generally considered to be an intentional tort, requiring proof that the 
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states that the one-year prescription applies to all delictual 
actions.22 
The decision turns on how to define the operating cause of the 
damage, and the majority opinion is consistent with jurisprudence 
regarding the continuing tort doctrine.23 The Louisiana Civil Code 
offers no guidance regarding the continuing tort doctrine, which 
has developed primarily through jurisprudence. In Crump,24 the 
Louisiana Supreme Court defined the operating cause of the injury 
in order to determine the applicability of the continuing tort 
doctrine. In that case, the defendants created a canal on land 
adjacent to the plaintiff’s, which caused continued flooding on the 
plaintiff’s land. The Court held that the operating cause was 
digging the canal - not the water that was spilled onto plaintiff’s 
land.25 Instead, the Court characterized the water that remained on 
plaintiff’s land as the “continuing ill effects arising from a single 
tortuous act.”26 The initial act of digging the canal was the 
operating cause of the injury suffered, not the continued presence 
of the water on the plaintiff’s property. The Supreme Court 
presented the issue as a problem of determining where the line 
between cause and effect was drawn, and essentially held that only 
the initial act should be considered the operating cause of the 
injury suffered within the context of the continuing tort doctrine. 
Justice Knoll’s dissent argues in favor of considering the 
presence of the gasoline a continuing tort that would suspend 
prescription, which differs from the majority position that views 
the “operating cause” of the tortious effects as only the initial act 
of the defendants. Justice Weimer, writing for the majority, defines 
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2012] HOGG V. CHEVRON USA, INC. 245 
 
 
 
the operating cause of the injury as the actual leaking of the 
gasoline from the tanks. In contrast, Justice Knoll’s position is that 
the continued presence of the gasoline is causing the harmful 
effects to plaintiffs and therefore the presence should be 
considered the cause of the injury suffered. The fundamental 
question of where to draw the line for cause and effect27 is 
apparently still contentious among current Justices of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court. The majority’s holding, aligned with Louisiana 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, considers the leak from the tanks the 
initial, operating cause of the injury, and therefore it alone is the 
tortious activity in the present case. Consequently, the 
contamination of plaintiffs’ land itself is the injury, or the effect, of 
the operating cause along with any additional effects that may arise 
as a result of the leak. 
In light of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s past rulings 
regarding the doctrine of continuing tort and the holding in this 
case, there is a clear indication that the Court is unwilling to 
expand the prescriptive period beyond the initial act (or acts) 
constituting the operating cause of the injury. The prescriptive 
period in such cases begins to run as soon as the defendant’s 
tortious conduct ceases and the plaintiff knows or should know of 
the damage caused by the act. 
However, it is worth noting that Louisiana is not alone in its 
confusion over the appropriate circumstances for the continuing 
tort doctrine’s application. For example, in Nieman v. NLO, Inc.,28 
the federal Sixth Circuit ruled that Ohio’s continuing trespass 
doctrine requires no showing of continuing conduct, but rather 
                                                                                                             
 27. The question of whether the continuing conduct (cause) or the 
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recognized in national sources as an area that is generally unsettled. See 54 
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only a showing of continuing damage. Interestingly, Judge 
Krupansky’s dissent mirror’s the Louisiana Supreme Court 
majority’s reasoning in Hogg, noting that “[o]ngoing conduct is the 
key to a continuing tort. Where no continuing action by the 
defendant is necessary to effect the damage in controversy—that 
is, where the tort is an accomplished fact, such as when intangible 
pollutants have impacted the plaintiff's property…—the tort is 
permanent” and thus prescribed. 
 
